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Abstract. This document provides an overview of the infrastructure megaproject 
industry (IMPI), the financial implications of cost and schedule overruns, and the 
trend towards the future impacts these may have on the global infrastructure sphere. 
Definitions of project management and procurement delivery models provide a 
framework for understanding the relevance of the subject matter. A sample of 
methodologies and best practices for project management indicate the breadth of 
diverse approaches available in the industries. A cause analysis of megaproject 
overruns with accompanying solutions suggests areas of industry improvement, 
supported by the first-hand experience by the author. The paper concludes that the 
IMPI and the associate methodologies must evolve to meet the demands of future 
infrastructure to be able to deliver the projects successfully and with the positive 
impact on the outcome. This evolution will be through improving and expanding 
knowledge, experience and intellectual capital of public and private industry Project 
Managers while determining some next steps to progress the industry.  
 





There is a knowledge gap in the infrastructure megaproject industry (IMPI) in the 
area of project management as it exists today. Past trends show, on average, an 
11% loss in major or megaprojects, across all industries, due to poor project 
performance. Further analysis in the infrastructure industry indicates that nine in 
ten megaprojects experience cost overruns with an average cost escalation of 28% 
(Siemiatycki, 2015). Analysis of past megaprojects in the infrastructure industry 
indicates project management as a contributing factor attributing to the losses. 
Project management relies on methodologies, intellectual capital, knowledge, 
innovation, and experience to manage megaprojects. These foundations will be the 
global infrastructure project trend of the future. Current project management 
knowledge and methodologies must advance and expand to provide Project 
Managers with the skills required to succeed in the infrastructure industry. The 
definition of success requires evaluation and update from its current state which is 
deficient and constricting criteria when assessing project success. Megaprojects 
will continue to evolve and grow to accommodate the infrastructure demands of 
cities and nations. These project management skills must expand beyond budget, 
schedule, quality, safety, and customer management to include: 
620 | Crystal COLE 
Project Management Evolution to Improve Success in Infrastructure Projects  
 
- Expansion of knowledge and intellectual capital management; 
- Risk management; 
- Planning and projection; 
- Expanded life cycle integration; 
- Change management;  
- Operations and warranty management; and  
- Stakeholder management.  
 
This will require a change in the industry to leverage the already available 
intellectual capital gained from successful projects, to improve megaproject 
delivery of infrastructure, and minimize productivity losses through expansion of 
the industry knowledge base. An improvement in megaproject outcomes has the 
ability to positively affect developed and emergent economies through the 
improved budget management of tax-funded initiatives. This paper is an expansion 





This paper utilizes qualitative research to support the author’s own project and 
program management experience in the global infrastructure industry. Due to 
confidentiality agreements, specific personal references will not be used. 
Observations about the industry, as experienced, have been supported by external 
and published sources from various fields of expertise to emphasize the extent of 
study completed and the magnitude of the industry challenge. Data was gathered 
from past global industry projects to extrapolate future trends and determine 
where project management needs to evolve to improve the state of the industry. 
Additional fundamental knowledge areas that will improve project management 
expertise include planning and risk management, change leadership, innovation, 





A traditional project is defined as “a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a 
unique product, service, or result. The temporary nature of projects indicates that a 
project has a definite beginning and end” (Project Management Institute, 2004) or 
“a temporary organization and process set up to achieve a specified goal under the 
constraints of time, budget and other resources” (Shenhar & Dvir 2007, p.5).  
 
Megaprojects are defined as “large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost US$1 
billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and 
private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014, p.6). 
 
The action of project management, defined as “the application of knowledge, skills, 
tools and techniques to project activities to meet project requirements” (Project 
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Management Institute, 2004) or, “Project Management is the set of managerial 
activities needed to lead a project to a successful end” (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007, p.5). 
 
Project success has varying definitions depending on methodology and industry. 
Project success can be measured “by product and project quality, timeliness, budget 
compliance, and degree of customer satisfaction” (Project Management Institute, 
2004). This definition fails to include the impact or outcome of the result which the 
Diamond approach, developed by Shenhar and Dvir (2007), looked to address. The 
Diamond approach utilizes a diamond shaped framework that includes four 
dimensions: novelty, technology, complexity and pace (NTCP). As part of NTCP, the 
diamond approach includes these five dimensions of project success; project 
efficiency, impact to the customer, impact on the team, business and direct success; 
and preparation for the future (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). 
 
The Price Waterhouse Coopers (2014) definition of infrastructure includes: 
Extraction – Oil and Gas, natural resources; Utilities – Power Generation, Electricity, 
Gas, Water, Telecoms; Manufacturing – Petroleum refining, Chemical, Heavy metals; 
Transport – Rail, Roads, Airports, Ports; and Social – Hospitals, Schools. 
 
Public Private Partnerships, (PPP or P3) have various structures and definitions as 
referenced by Plourde et al. (2009, p.6) that include “a cooperative venture 
between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that 
best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of 
resources, risks and rewards” as stated by The Canadian Council for P3s (CCPPP). 
Partnership BC (2011) defines P3s as “a public private partnership is a partnership 
arrangement in the form of a long-term performance-based contract between the 
public sector (any level of government) and the private sector (usually a team of 
private sector companies working together) to deliver public infrastructure for 
citizens. A public private partnership could be any kind of infrastructure or service 
such as a new hospital or bridge or highway, a new type of technology that delivers 
services in a faster and more efficient manner, or a new federal government 
building – anything that citizens typically expect their governments to provide.”  
 
In Ontario, P3s are also known as Alternative Financing and Procurement (AFP) 
(Plourde et al., 2009, p. 6). P3s may vary by model or by project and follow various 
structures or approaches. These are defined as quoted and condensed from Plourde 
et al. (2009, pp.14-16): 
 
“Design-Build (DB): a public owner enters into a legal agreement with a contractor 
that engages with consulting engineers or other design professionals to design and 
build the asset according to requirements set out by the public owner. 
 
Design-Bid-Build (DBB); the design team is engaged by the public owner and 
prepares the design for the asset working in closely with the owner and users. The 
design team then prepares detailed bid documents and invites contractors to bid on 
constructing the project. The design team reviews the construction of the asset and 
typically administers the construction contract on behalf of the owner. 
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Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate (DBFMO): the public owner enters into a 
project agreement with a legal entity created to provide the design, build, finance, 
and life cycle maintenance/operation of the asset. The term of this project 
agreement can be 25 to 35 or more years. At the end of the agreement, the owner 
takes over the asset and responsibility for its maintenance and operation. 
 
Design-Build-Finance-Own-Maintain-Operate-Transfer (DBFOMOT): this model 
builds on the DBFMO P3 with the consortium now also owning the infrastructure 
for the term of the project agreement, then transferring ownership of the asset to 
the public owner at the end of the term.  
 
Design-Build-Finance and Maintain (DBFM): differs from DBFMO in that the 
operation of the asset is not included in the project agreement but remains the 
responsibility and an asset of the public owner. …maintenance of the asset is the 
responsibility of the consortium during the term of the project agreement. 
 
Design-Build-Finance (DBF): the public owner contracts with the private sector to 
design and construct the asset. …the asset is always owned, maintained and 
operated by the public sector. 
 
Build-Finance (BF): The original designers were engaged to review and update 
their designs and documents that were used to invite proposals from contractors 
who would construct the asset and also provide construction phase financing. 
 
Build-Finance-Maintain (BFM): the public owner executes a project agreement with 
a consortium to build the asset, provide construction phase financing, and then 
maintain the asset during the term of the agreement.” 
 
For this paper, the Project Management Institute (2004) definitions are utilized and 
augmented by Shenhar and Dvir (2007), with Flyvbjerg (2014) providing further 
detail as it pertains to megaprojects and the expanse of the infrastructure industry 
beyond typical projects definition. The infrastructure focus is on megaprojects in 
sectors interfacing with transportation, as it is the author’s area of expertise. The 
supporting data and conclusions will apply to all infrastructure industries defined 
by Price Waterhouse Coopers (2014). When referencing P3s and AFPs, they have 






Megaprojects valuing over US$1B in the global infrastructure industry are 
increasingly in the spotlight due to the scrutiny and public reporting of cost 
overruns and schedule delays. The consequences include negative financial results 
and damages to the reputation of major public and private organizations with the 
potential to impact nations on a global scale. This problem continues to be 
researched and documented without improvement.  
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In the results stated by the Project Management Institute (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017); 
projects continue to show industry losses of more than 10% on average and as 
indicated in Table 1: Project Loss Trend. That equates to $110 million loss for every 
billion dollars spent on projects. The loss is equalized across currencies but can 
compound when projects encounter multiple currencies and exchange rates due to 
global economic impacts over the duration of a megaproject.  
 
Table 1. Project Loss Trend 
Year $ M Loss / $1 B Percentage loss 
2014 $109 11 
2015 $109 11 
2016 $122 12 
2017 $97 10 
4 Year Average $109.25 11 
 
This overrun trend is representative of all types of projects. Research indicates that 
smaller, simpler projects overrun less and the cost and schedule estimates are more 
accurate. In infrastructure, small construction and maintenance projects that can be 
completed over a shorter timeframe and involve fewer sub-contractors average 
between four and 9.5 percent in overruns. An indication that small, routine projects 
are less likely to suffer the effects of political impacts and cumbersome decision-
making processes experienced in megaprojects (Siemiatycki, 2015). 
 
The global infrastructure megaproject budgets are estimated at approximately 4% 
of the global gross domestic product per year (Flyvbjerg, 2014). The state of the 
global megaproject industry is well documented with research data indicating cost 
overruns in nine out of ten projects (Flyvbjerg, 2014). This can result in serious 
damage to national economies as demonstrated in Brazil with the hosting of the 
2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics (Flyvbjerg, 2013). In the 
infrastructure industry, studies indicate the following overruns by discipline as 
provided in Table 2: Average Overrun by Discipline, which has remained constant 
for 70 years based on available data (Siemiatycki, 2015): 
 
Table 2. Average Overrun by Discipline 
Discipline Average Overrun 
Rail 45% 
Bridges/ Tunnels 34% 
Surface Roads 20% 
 
Earlier analyses of project data found a similar conclusion of megaprojects failing to 
meet time and budget goals 85% of the time with an average schedule overrun of 
70% and 60% overrun of the budget. (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). Overruns of time or 
budget have been documented as high as 90% for infrastructure megaprojects 
(Banaszak, Palter, & Parsons, 2017). Project ownership, public or private, is not a 
factor influencing the results (Banaszak et al., 2017). The location of megaprojects 
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does not appear to influence results as projects in Europe and the Americas have 
similar results for infrastructure projects and, therefore, may be disregarded as a 
factor to influence results (Siemiatycki, 2015).  
 
“Most projects regarded as a failure usually do not manage to meet one or more 
criteria of scope, time, and quality, resulting in a low return on investment (ROI)”.  
(The Standish Group International, 2015) 
 
The global infrastructure industry contains some of the largest megaprojects in 
either the planning stage or execution of the project life cycle process. In 2014, 
spending worldwide on infrastructure was $4.2 trillion. By 2025 capital project and 
infrastructure spending is estimated to total more than $9 trillion (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2014). If this continues, global construction in infrastructure 
will outpace global GDP by 2025, with 63% of the construction occurring in 
emerging markets (McNichol, 2015). 
 
Current expenditure on infrastructure reflects a $1 trillion shortfall against annual 
global investment demand, and by 2030 there will be a $14 trillion shortfall. 
Developed and emerging markets are experiencing a surge in demand in the 
infrastructure sectors including transportation, freight, communications, water, 
clean energy and stable power. This demand is increasing the need for transit 
systems improvement that will reduce congestion and handle increases in capacity 
as there is a greater focus on global urbanization, increases in population density 
and the impacts on climate change. This surge is attracting private investors to 
provide the needed funding in return for low risk investment (Arcadis, 2016). 
There is also a shortage of companies and experienced Project Managers that can 
deliver these project demands (Beckers et al., 2013; McNichol, 2015).  
 
As demand for infrastructure megaprojects continues to increase, the trends 
indicate cost and schedule overruns will continue to have global impacts. The 
industry will have a shortfall of funds to cover the projects, and a shortage of skilled 
Project Managers to execute the megaprojects successfully. Investors are finding 
funding challenges for these projects due to the “preparation gap or a shortage of 
well prepared, bankable P3 projects where investors are sufficiently reassured by 
the commercial and technical feasibility, the risk allocation, the public sector’s 
contractual commitment and capacity as well as the institutional and legal 
framework” (McNichol, 2015, p.6). In order for the industry to mitigate losses, and 
be able to deliver on the future demands of the infrastructure megaprojects, 
strengthening project management is a core requirement. 
 
 
Project management as intellectual capital 
 
Project Management is an intellectual capital commodity with its foundation being 
in knowledge and experience. The industry is relatively young; starting in the 
1950’s with military applications then dispersing to other industries as the positive 
affect and value of project management on delivery was realized (Shenhar & Dvir, 
2004). The outputs of project management are tangible and measurable. They 
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include plans, reports, and schedules, tracking and monitoring elements and 
ultimately, a final deliverable or project goal. The ability to manage projects 
successfully comes from the knowledge and experience gained by the Project 
Manager within their specific fields, over time. This experience includes the ability 
to utilize gained knowledge on future projects by developing an internal repertoire 
of best practices and risk mitigation to innovate, create continuous improvement, 
and ultimately project success. Megaproject management takes this experience to a 
higher level of expertise requiring further evolution from current practices in order 
to reduce project loss and ensure successful global infrastructure project delivery.  
 
Traditional project management, in theory and practice, references the following 
methodologies that were developed as guidelines for execution and successful 
management of projects (Project Management Institute, 2004): 
- PMI/PMBOK Method; 
- Agile, Adaptive Life Cycles, Change Driven, Scrum, Kanban; 
- Waterfall; 
- Prince2; 
- Critical Path Method (CPM); 
- Critical Chain Method (CCM); 
- Precedence diagramming method (PDM); 
- Activity-on-node (AON); 
- Six Sigma, Lean; and 
- Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) or three-point estimating. 
 
Other methodologies include: 
- NTCP Model, or Diamond Approach (Orhof, Shenhar, & Dori, 2013); and 
- Strategically managed, aligned, regenerative, and transitional (SMART) (Hartman, 
2000). 
 
This list of methodologies is not exhaustive but is an indication of the vast 
approaches and variations of techniques that exist within the project management 
industry. Another theory that the above list indicates is that one methodology does 
not align with all project types (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007), as methodologies are 
developed in response to a need in the industry.  
 
Not all of the developed methodologies are adaptable to the megaproject or to 
infrastructure projects. Agile, Scrum and Waterfall have focused on the software 
development industries. Six Sigma and Lean can be utilized to achieve reduction of 
variation and continuous improvement in manufacturing or process based projects 
through eliminating waste and improving flows. CPM and CCM are schedule 
analysis based with a focus on the sequence of tasks and flow versus constraints, 
resource availability, and uncertainty. The PMI’s PMBOK methodology focuses on 
structuring projects into five project lifecycle groups of initiating, planning, 
executing, controlling, and closing, attempting to standardize a process foundation 
adaptable to all projects. 
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Understanding infrastructure megaprojects as defined earlier provides an 
indication of the substantial scope and requirements and emphasizes that Project 
Managers must rely on a multitude of methodologies, in addition to experience, 
innovation and personal intellectual capital to drive a project to a successful 
delivery. Megaproject managers may incorporate some or all of the methodologies 
mentioned above and incorporate others not listed here. There may also be an 
amalgamation of methodologies to utilize some aspects that are appropriate for the 
project and reject others as the needs, phase or scope of the project requires. Since 
megaproject span years, impact populations and require advanced financing 
opportunities, the ability to adapt and utilize all methodologies is key. While 
megaproject exists to solve the complex infrastructure problems and may have 
unique elements, most are not unique in their entirety, allowing for an integration 
of methodologies and adaptation of previous projects lessons learned.  
 
An alternate methodology would be to include applications of change leadership for 
use in megaproject management. Both rely on the soft skills and management of 
human capital that requires knowledge, experience, and intellectual capital 
applications. Although megaproject management and change leadership struggle, 
with cost overruns, delays and define success it’s as it relates to the initiative goal 
or outcome, they both must address the impact of change. The leading causes of 
failure of change are resistance to the change from those impacted and governance 
behaviors that do not support the desired changes (Blackburn, Ryerson, Weiss, 
Wilson, & Wood, 2011). IBM has analyzed change leadership and suggested the 
following solutions for improvement change project success (IBM Global Services, 
2008): 
1) Strive for a full, realistic awareness and understanding of the upcoming 
challenges and complexities, then follow with actions to address them; 
2) Use a systematic approach to change that is focused on outcomes and closely 
aligned with formal project management methodology; 
3) Leverage resources appropriately to demonstrate top management 
sponsorship, assign dedicated Change Managers and empower employees to enact 
change; 
4) Allocate the right amount for change management by understanding which 
types of investments can offer the best returns, in terms of greater project success. 
 
 
Megaproject overruns: cause analysis 
 
Megaprojects are a different type of project due to their magnitude, stakeholder 
involvement, complexity, and impact. Which results in megaprojects being a 
different type of project to lead and manage, requiring extensive experience in the 
specific project field (Flyvbjerg, 2017). 
 
The magnitude of cost overruns for megaproject in infrastructure, as previously 
stated, will continue as owners continue to award projects to meet the growing 
global infrastructure needs but don’t change the way megaproject management is 
conducted. The knowledge base is established and unchallenged but there needs to 
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be a change in the way megaproject management is executed. The author reviewed 
data of cost and schedule overruns in various industries, public and private 
ownerships, located in various global locations, and delivered under different 
contractual systems. The data included the transportation infrastructure 
megaprojects listed below (Allport, Brown, Glaister & Travers, 2008; Cantarelli, 
2011; Flyvbjerg, 2014; Siemiatycki, 2015): 
- London: The Jubilee Line Extension;  
- The London Underground Public Private Partnership (P3); 
- Docklands Light Railway; 
- Channel Tunnel (Eurotunnel), United Kingdom and France; 
- New York Subway Upgrades; 
- Paris Light Rail (RATP); 
- Boston's Big Dig; 
- Toronto Spadina Subway Extension; 
- Toronto Union Station Revitalization; 
- Toronto PRESTO fair collection card; 
- Denver International Airport. 
 
Of the project results data reviewed, consistent themes and conclusions emerged 
for causes of megaproject overruns of budget and schedule. The results are 
consolidated into three groups and summarized by the group.  
 
The first theme for cost overruns of infrastructure megaprojects was a lack of 
project management and controls. The elements that may be included in this 
category are extensive and cover a number of elements that, when intertwined, and 
affect each other. The initial item as part of project controls is a poor organization 
of the project and the project governance decision making and procurement do not 
have the required speed and scale for the project (Changali, Mohammad & van 
Nieuwland, 2015). Another element is inadequate communication including 
reporting inconsistencies resulting in stakeholders having different interpretations 
and understandings of the status at any given stage in the project and flawed 
performance management which leaves issues unresolved and allows project risks 
to increase due to lack of communication and accountability (Changali et al., 2015). 
Project controls include commercial and contractual management. When poorly 
done, transfer of project responsibility from procurement in the negotiation phase 
to project managers for the implementation, commissioning and closeout stages 
may result in misinterpretation and understanding of contract issues and how to 
resolve or proceed (Changali et al., 2015). 
 
Project controls also include team and resource management. Limited talent 
management by the owners, contractors, and consultants or not providing the best 
and most suited people for the project in addition to a lack of available resources 
with competent qualifications will impact the success of the project (Changali et al., 
2015). Resource management may extend to projects being led by Managers 
without extensive domain experience, or that change throughout the long project 
lifecycle which results in weak project leadership (Flyvbjerg, 2017). A lack of 
leadership and constraints on qualified resources for the owners, engineers, and 
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contractors resulting in leaders without megaproject experience and the associated 
skills to manage in intense contractual, operational and business environments 
(Patmore, 2017) may also affect cost overruns. 
 
Infrastructure projects are complex as are the controls systems put in place to 
monitor and report on the project status. Only managing to time and budget 
constraints and not taking into account the ability to use the end product as 
intended at the capacity or functional level required (McManus, 2016) will affect 
project outcomes. Adaptation of poor procedures that are adopted by project 
owners including getting too involved in the project causing scope creep and 
rework at increased costs or being too distant from the project resulting in delays 
and slow decisions and involvement of external third parties (Banaszak et al., 2017) 
has a direct impact on cost overruns. Inappropriate delivery method or utilization 
of the same delivery method for all types of projects has the ability to result in cost 
overruns. For example, using DBB, DB, AFP, for all road projects (McManus, 2016). 
A lack of integration at various levels in megaprojects including considerations of 
management, between transportation modes, between infrastructures, land use, 
and jurisdictions (Allport et al., 2008) will affect cost overruns and the potential for 
expensive changes to integrate allow for appropriate end usage. 
 
Project controls also includes technical challenges as stated by Siemiatycki (2015) 
including scope changes and change orders after the “go decision” resulting in cost 
increases; handover problems between the designers, contractors, owners, and 
operators over work quality, responsibility, integration and intended operation; 
and poor project reporting and performance monitoring by owners and reliance on 
contractors past reputation instead of current project delivery.  
 
The second theme resulting in cost overruns to megaprojects in infrastructure 
evolves around poor upfront planning (Banaszak et.al., 2017; Changali et al., 2015; 
Shenhar & Dvir. 2007; Siemiatycki, 2015). The most prominent theme was 
projected biases which include various elements. Optimism bias is the most 
extensive and results in a tendency to assess future events in a more positive light 
than is warranted by actual experience (Flyvbjerg & Techn, 2006) and display 
overconfidence in abilities, talents, and skills (Siemiatycki, 2015). Unique Bias is a 
tendency of planners and managers to see their projects as firsts or unique, which 
impedes learning from other projects (Flyvbjerg, 2013). Cognitive biases result in 
systematic and predictably that is susceptible to errors when forming judgments in 
uncertain situations and can include overconfidence or overreliance on guidelines 
or concepts resulting in the underestimation of risk (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier & 
Lunn, 2016). 
 
Other biases include strategic misrepresentation by the project owners 
(governments) and approvers of cost, schedule or benefits to get the project 
approved, knowing that once started, few projects will be stopped with the impact 
being with the operator or end user (Tax payer) (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Siemiatycki, 
2015). Also, owners rely on overly optimistic budgets at the beginning of the 
process, bad assumptions, and aggressive value engineering that trick owners into 
believing budgets and margins can be achieved, and owners not questioning the 
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process or oversight in the estimates (Patmore, 2017). Projects proceeding with 
incomplete engineering and feasibility studies may result in owners expediting 
approvals of urgent projects and securing inaccurate funding to meet urgent, 
political or election timelines (Siemiatycki, 2015). Owners having inaccurate 
forecasting due to project complexity, uncertainty, changes in external conditions 
and inappropriate estimation methods (Siemiatycki, 2015) may also result in 
megaproject overruns. When there is an inflation in labor and material costs caused 
by the need for specialized resources and materials in a time of economic demand 
and growth (Siemiatycki, 2015), project costs are difficult to forecast, budget and 
control.  
 
Poor project planning and execution and not including operations, maintenance or 
end use stakeholders and interface partners (McManus, 2016) will result in 
changes, often late in the process which contribute to cost overruns which are 
difficult to control. 
 
The third item refers to for cost overruns of infrastructure megaprojects was 
insufficient risk management. This includes late identification and resolution of 
errors or risks (Patmore, 2017) and not allowing for project delays from external 
stakeholders including unions and utilities, unforeseen events that may include 
extreme weather, contaminants or artefacts and no management plan and 
performance monitoring to manage and mitigate unforeseen risks (Siemiatycki, 
2015). Other risk items with impact on megaprojects include owners, not including 
long planning horizons and complex interfaces (Flyvbjerg, 2017) and transferring 
risk to the consultants or contractors which results in the management of risks in 
isolation without collaboration (McManus, 2016).  
 
In addition to the three themes, there are secondary causes of project failure worth 
noting. One is that the definition of success only follows the triple constraint model 
or iron triangle of: on time, within budget, within performance goals (Shenhar & 
Dvir, 2007) and the notion that one type of project management methodology fits 
all types of projects and following text book methodologies will achieve project 
success (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). 
 
Through the research process of the summarized themes and conclusions, the 
results for cost and schedule overruns indicate many generalized causes, but 
nothing specific and consistent. This broad range definition also provides insight 
into the complexities of megaproject management, in that there isn’t one element 
that is key to being able to predict that a project will be unsuccessful. This may be 
due to the term “project management” being too broad to use as an exact cause for 
megaproject overruns (Cantarelli, 2011). The solutions will be complex and multi-
faceted. Ahiaga-Dagbui, Smith, Love, and Ackermann (2015, p.863) concluded that 
“cost overrun research has largely stagnated in the refinement and advancement of 
the knowledge area. It has largely been superficial and replicative. A significant 
paradigm and methodological shift may be required to address this perennial and 
complex problem faced in construction project delivery.”.  
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The methodologies mentioned in Section 6 focus on the performance and 
evaluation of projects and the ability to plan and control with a representation in 
reports, charts, graphs and calculated analysis. The focus is lineal with project 
status reflected in the numerical calculation which allows for recognition of issues 
relating to project performance. What the methodologies miss is the interpretation 
and analysis that comes from intellectual capital, knowledge, and experience from 
the project manager and leadership team.  
“Everybody is concerned about how to do the job, not about the outcome if the job is 
done well.” (Hardy-Vallee, 2012, p.3). 
 
 
Solutions for infrastructure megaproject management 
 
In researching the IMPI for causes for cost and schedule overruns, various solutions 
were suggested. The solutions are categorized into the same three themes as the 
causes. For project management and controls the concept of having a focus on 
strong theory and good data would help bring the field forward academically and 
professionally (Flyvbjerg, 2017). In the UK, implementation of the training of 
government Megaproject Managers, as exemplified by the Major Project Leadership 
Academy, Oxford England (Flyvbjerg, 2014) is an initial step. Further developments 
in strategic management research, broaden the notion of stakeholder management 
to better consider pressing issues of future generations and the natural 
environment (Flyvbjerg, 2017) would also be a consideration.  
 
Owners need to improve procedures and help drive innovation vital to promoting 
change, stop scope creep, rework and delays through slow decision making (Allport 
et al., 2008; Banaszak et al., 2017; Omega Centre, 2012). Owners need to manage 
more than just time and budget and include the functional goals in the project 
success criteria. The inclusion of an independent assessor or governing entity on 
behalf of the owner to oversee the effective management of large-scale projects 
funded and delivered by governments (Flyvbjerg, 2014) and monitor the project 
status on all requirements (McManus, 2016; Omega Centre, 2012) has proven 
successful in some instances.  
 
The PMI has evolved the “measure of success to include the percentage of projects 
that are completed on time, on a budget, and meeting original goals and business 
intent with levels of benefits realization maturity” which includes successful 
business outcomes (Project Management Institute, 2017). Further applications of 
appropriate delivery methods for each project instead of the same for all capital 
projects (McManus, 2016) or provision of a new delivery model for megaprojects 
aimed at securing innovation and flexibility in projects (Flyvbjerg, 2017) may 
reduce cost and schedule overruns.  
 
Other solutions include openly sharing the megaproject status and holding 
stakeholders of involved businesses and agencies accountable (Flyvbjerg, 2014) 
and employing lean construction tools for collaborative decision making and global 
sourcing of materials for availability and efficient pricing relying on connected 
inventories (Banaszak et al., 2017). 
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The second grouping of solutions for megaproject cost and schedule overruns 
focuses on upfront planning and considering the projects’ legacy to include long 
term benefits, skills development, economic improvement, knowledge expansion 
and building of capability in the industry (McManus, 2016). Involvement of 
operations and maintenance experts from the beginning of the project to provide 
insight into decisions that will affect the total cost of ownership (Allport et al., 
2008; McManus, 2016) and investing to improve performance and innovation so 
Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) firms have an incentive to depart 
“from tried and true” (Banaszak et al., 2017) may also deter cost and schedule 
overruns. 
 
Implementation of procedures to curb “Optimum bias” and “strategic 
misrepresentation” (Flyvbjerg, 2014) and developing an understanding of the 
similarities to other projects will provide a means of Megaproject Managers to be 
able to learn from these projects and instill preventative measures. Megaproject 
managers that view their projects as unique perform significantly worse than other 
managers (Budzier & Flyvbjerg, 2013). 
 
In the concept and design phase there are various mitigation techniques that would 
allow for improvement of cost and schedule overruns including (Changali et al., 
2015): 
1) Build only what is needed and design-to-value. Focus on a functional design and 
eliminate items that increase costs; 
2) Consider the full life-cycle costs of a project including operations and 
maintenance. Insure designers and Project Managers have awareness of net 
present value and link incentives to improvement; 
3) Optimize and take into account site constraints and external elements or 
conditions to reduce construction and operation costs; 
4) Consider, wherever possible modular design and standardization. Borrow from 
others to replicate and avoid unique and expensive design, construction and end 
user costs; 
5) Optimize engineering processes and choices in productivity, integration, 
provision of direction to prevent rework and inclusion of appropriate technology to 
improve productivity; 
6) Define the contracting and procurement approach in the planning phase to 
minimize costs and risks and ensure the approach is assessed and appropriate for 
each project; 
7) Use an integrated risk approach that shares risk with the owner and transfer 
risks to the contractor where they have influence;  
8) Establish a change and claims management approach to expedite and minimize 
time loss and disputes; 
9) Align contractor and owners’ interests with defined payment structures and a 
balance of incentives and penalties. 
 
Risk Management is the third proposed solution areas to reduce cost and schedule 
overruns in infrastructure megaprojects. Risk management concept so support 
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project success includes “Relational Contracting” or pooling of delivery risk and 
sharing of profits or balancing of risks (Banaszak et al., 2017; McManus, 2016). 
 
The owner could define rules that force accountability upon bidders and owners 
should provide some predictability for future available funding (Allport et al., 2008) 
to allow contractors and consultants insight into funding requirements and 
restrictions but indicate security of project funding amounts. 
 
The creative use of insurance by offering incentives to work to avoid claims 
(Banaszak et al., 2017) and overinvesting in planning and set up the project 
organization for success over the entire life-cycle to reduce the risk of knowledge 
loss (Changali et al., 2015) are other risk mitigation factors to be considered. Also, 
paying more attention to lessons learned on positive projects (Flyvbjerg, 2014) and 
implementing the successful elements may provide reductions in cost and schedule 
overruns.  
 
It's time to update project management not with more methodologies, but with 
more emotional content. Employees' and stakeholders' disengagement can make a 
project fail, but behavior-based management can make projects succeed. (Hardy-
Vallee, 2012). The ability to manage the human capital during the project process 
and the impact on the outcome of the project is key to the success of megaprojects. 
 
 
Perspective: inside the infrastructure industry  
 
From a project management perspective inside the infrastructure industry, 
megaproject management needs to evolve to include integration management, 
change leadership, and project conception planning. This definition of a 
megaproject needs to expand to include service operation and delivery while 
managing stakeholders, phasing interfaces, and adapting to real time risk 
management. Due to the long life-cycle of megaprojects, Project Managers require 
an understanding of technological advancements and external impacts that allow 
for continuous improvements. To achieve all of this, Megaproject Managers in the 
infrastructure industry will need to rely on years of experience, knowledge and 
intellectual capital gathered from previous projects to be able to deliver 
megaprojects. Despite all of the recognized skills and the decades of experience, 
there are not any guarantees that the projects will be considered a success.  
 
The industry requires a motivational push to improve megaproject delivery. 
Awareness of the project status in the developed nations is the first step in 
accountability. Another step is valuing megaproject management as an intensified 
and strengthened skill sets supported by knowledge, innovation, and experience 
aligned with engineering, architecture, and planning. These skills are critical to 
industry success. The industry needs Project Managers that are trained, through 
education and project experience in the public sector as owners. These skills are 
equally critical in the private sector, as project implementers. Having exposure to 
theory and in-process projects is essential to understanding the complexities of 
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megaproject management. An understanding of people, commercial, contractual 
and integration management from concept to warranty completion is crucial. 
 
From personal project experience on the London Underground Jubilee Line 
Extension, the London Underground (P3), the Dubai Light Rail Metro project, and 
various rail transportation projects in Ontario, Canada, the above-mentioned 
findings align with projects within the authors’ local environment as reported in 
newspapers and corresponding news sites. The upfront planning requires re-
evaluation on the governance and supported business cases to ensure the projects 
are based on accurate estimates and technical evaluation. Infrastructure planning 
struggles to succeed when based on political agenda instead of expert analysis and 
ridership demand. This can result in ineffective projects proceeding and leaving 
voids in other areas of infrastructure. News publications continue to report on 
project overruns, councils voting against the experts and consultant’s findings, and 
politicians without experience in project and infrastructure planning or risk 
analysis making financing and project approval decisions. Millions of tax funds are 
spent on studies in an attempt to achieve the answers or promises provided in 
election campaigns. Accountability is lacking in project ownership and the tax base 
pays the ultimate prices in terms of reduced job creation or projects that do not 
achieve the promised capacity or purpose, or the cost of operation and 
maintenance exceeds the benefits anticipated. 
 
Canada is expanding the AFP model to utilize risk transference and allow for 
private funding of public infrastructure. This is still in its early stages in terms of 
project implementation and has experienced success and failures. It is not a 
solution of one fits all for projects and AFP continues to need refining to determine 
the correct megaproject use for successful implementation. It is a system that 
continues to struggle with the success of on budget on schedule delivery. This is an 
example of developed cities and nations appearing slow to learn from the lessons 
learned from others. For instance, the Jubilee Line Extension as private partnership 
project was fraught with challenges and on structure, governance, risk alignment 
and goal definition (Allport et al., 2008). AFP’s and P3’s continue to be executed and 
continue to struggle with the challenges experienced. With the impact in the 
billions, there is a greater effect that can reach further than the initial project. 
Municipal and regional government projects and incentives are cut to remain 
within overall constraints imposed by federal government levels. Scope reduction 
in areas of education and healthcare may occur due to the mismanagement of 
infrastructure projects. One initiative includes the introduction of private financing 
and investing is to assist in improving project delivery and combating the impacts 
elsewhere. 
 
The infrastructure sector is finding limited private firms capable of bidding of 
delivery of the megaprojects resulting in AFPs including P3 to bridge the resource 
and investment gaps (Garemo, Hjerpe & Mischke, 2015). Alternate delivery 
structures such as P3s, or variations of Design, Build, Finance, Operate, Maintain 
(DBFOM) are better at motivating project delivery goals but still focus on change 
notice and risk aversion which are included in the pricing. AFPs and P3s tend to be 
slow to react, unequaled in skill to workload, and are not structured for efficiency in 
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project delivery (Siemiatycki, 2015). P3s have their limits including no guarantee of 
higher productivity, or successful project deployment, and operational success. The 
efforts required to deliver complex P3 projects are extreme (Garemo et al., 2015). 
For P3s to be effective, public governance needs appropriate structure and 
financing guarantees beyond yearly budgets, and election cycles (Garemo et al., 
2015).  
 
Evolution of the industry is key to change the current state of project delivery and 
improve for the anticipated future. Understanding of the situation and a motivation 
for improvement on the owners, consultants, contractors, and operators is key to 
invoke change. In most cases, it is the end user or tax payer that would benefit from 
improvements in megaproject delivery. Considerations from the industry would 
include improving understanding that infrastructure megaprojects are different in 
terms of skills and requirements for successful delivery and that focusing on the 
outcome of the project in addition to the how and status reporting could provide 
delivery improvement. Having greater coordination of megaprojects at the global 
level to manage the resource demand and take into account the global risks of 
facing the developed and emerging nations in the future would allow for integrated 
national prioritization with potentially positive effects on nations for pricing, 
qualified resources and project financial allocation improving deficit impacts.  
 
Realizing and accounting for the effects of biases on megaprojects with improve the 
oversight and processes of initial estimates to allow for present and future value 
calculations would have a direct impact on project delivery. While, removal of 
megaprojects governance from public officials that are not experts in infrastructure 
planning, delivery or operation could eliminate strategic misrepresentation to 
initiate projects and progress them to the point of no return and forcing projects to 
completion at the costs of other project deletion or funding overruns.  
 
Understanding of the methodologies reviewed earlier in this paper is important to 
provide Project Managers the authority to draw on a repertoire of methodologies at 
any phase in the infrastructure megaprojects to contribute to successful delivery. 
Acknowledging that one methodology or project delivery method does not fit all is 
also a key to megaproject management success.  
 
Developing and expanding the knowledge and intellectual capital requirements of 
Megaproject Managers will be the starting solution point improve project success. 
Oxford University has started the knowledge improvement process by providing 
educational and practical field training for government Megaproject Managers 
through the Major Project Leadership Academy (Flyvbjerg, 2014). The megaproject 
industry needs to expand to international under graduate schools and includes 
private business management, as cost and schedule overruns apply to both public 
and private infrastructure (Siemiatycki, 2015). The experience quotient must 
include multiple and different methodologies, and diverse project experiences to 
make megaprojects successful (Gallup, 2012). To generate a certification for 
Megaproject Managers, will require consideration of various items in addition to 
education including project managers requiring experience and proven track 
records of project delivery prior to certification and a demonstration of people 
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management skills for project delivery in the application of megaproject 
management. Project Managers need to demonstrate an understanding of, and 
expansion of the project life-cycle from concept to operation, involving the urban 
planning, social (live, work, play), economic impacts, for society and have a level of 
business acumen with an understanding of project impact to the success or failure 
to the owner, delivery organization and end user. 
 
Megaproject Managers with the ability to innovate and implement continuous 
improvement with awareness in commercial and contractual management and 
reporting, negotiation experience of project contractual items and claims and 
understanding of technological applications to project success and the correct 
implementation of these systems (example: 7D Building Information Modelling 
(BIM)) can only strengthen the megaproject delivery success. 
 
Including change leadership as a methodology and critical soft skill set vital to the 
management and implementation of megaproject and structuring projects with 
qualified people in the correct positions to deliver the project effectively with the 
ability to apply proven stakeholder management will support the complexities and 
challenges for success that megaprojects present. Finally, the ability to streamline 
processes and avoid project waste with repetitive functions will provide positive 





Project management is a relatively young industry, borne out of necessity and it 
continues to evolve. Where engineering and architecture have been subdivided into 
specific classifications including civil, structural, industrial, operational, 
institutional, commercial, or transportation, project management is in the midst of 
a divergence of skill sets depending on project type and industry application. 
 
“Breaking from the insanity of repeating unreliable project-delivery practices is 
crucial if the sector is to raise productivity and deliver projects on time and to budget. 
Yet right now it is clear that we do not have the incentives or structures in place to 
drive this change” (Banaszak et al., 2017). 
 
This paper concentrated on the Infrastructure industry with a focus on 
megaprojects. The findings indicate that, for the infrastructure industry, one of the 
crucial areas of improvement to reduce continual losses is project management. 
Specifically, the experience and training of Project Managers in public and private 
infrastructure. Project management with a singular methodology or delivery 
focuses not enough to solve the documented project losses and is not pivotal to 
improving the overall success of megaproject delivery. With the other areas of 
expertise required for megaproject management success, the inclusion of change 
leadership and people management will have a place in megaproject delivery in the 
operations and end user implementation. 
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As the delivery methods of projects continue to evolve and expand to provide 
private investing dollars to fund public infrastructure, project success and 
expectations surrounding the return on the asset and benefit in end use will 
change. With P3’s and AFP’s continuing to grow in size and popularity, private 
business will need to see the benefit and return on investment to be willing to 
provide funding. Continual overruns have the potential to impact the private 
sectors with ripple effects of poor financial return resulting in fewer projects and 
projects of smaller size, job loss, and further economic impact as effects will be on 
the macroeconomic scale due to the size of the projects. The need for infrastructure 
projects to the population expansion of urban areas will continue to grow. 
Improvement and management of these projects is vital to meet the continuing 
need for infrastructure. 
 
Including and understanding the change leadership best practice methodologies for 
implementation on megaprojects is a demonstration of one area of the larger skill 
set required. Project management of megaprojects needs to evolve to go beyond the 
standard scope, cost, quality and customer management to include: 
- Extensive applicable experience; 
- Innovation and complex problem solving; 
- People leadership; 
- Enterprise risk management; and 
- Expanded knowledge and intellectual capital of project delivery gained through 
education and practical experience. 
 
Project Managers of megaprojects need the ability to employ numerous project 
management methodologies and need the experience to recognize and implement 
the appropriate methodology for each stage in the expanded project lifecycle. They 
also need to take into account the emotional needs of stakeholders and team 
members and not rely solely on the technical project management methodologies 
and processes (Gallup, 2012). 
 
“The soft stuff is hard” (IBM Global Services, 2008) 
The ability to adapt project management methodologies based on the project 
structure will be one key to improving the success of megaprojects. To move 
forward with an integrated global project management process more work is 
required to evaluate the need for a recognized governance or certification and 
alignment of the standards across countries. How will this be planned, controlled, 
evaluated and monitored? Who will be the governing body to plan and control it? 
Will Oxford University’s program expand and align with leading educational 
institutions globally to spread the intellectual capital and continuous improvement 
for the industry? Is there enough motivation for public and private industry to 
embrace this change? 
 
For infrastructure megaprojects, the definition of a project needs to expand to align 
with the procurement models and lifecycle. This will include the conceptual 
planning and business cases, as well as the responsibility for handover 
commissioning, and end user satisfaction and intended use. This aligns with 
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expanding the definition of a successful project to include operations and the goal 
achievement of the end user.  
 
To do this, owners need to share information, experience, and lessons learned from 
successful megaprojects (Siemiatycki, 2015). London’s Crossrail megaproject as an 
example to provide best practices and improve project implementation. Other 
examples of successful projects include London’s Docklands Light Rail, the 
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao and Paris-Lyon High Speed Rail projects (Flyvbjerg, 
2014). Further analysis of the AFP models and lessons learned with applications to 
new projects based on the success or failure of the past is required. Ensuring the 
governance and owners don’t continue to do what was implemented previously is 
also key. Which leads to the potential need for an independent checker or 
governing entity that can be impartial and not tied to the politics of infrastructure 
planning. 
 
Expanding the conclusion, as stated by Youker (2017, p.2) “as the Project 
Management profession moves into working on many different types of projects we 
are going to have to move to a new level in the project management body of 
knowledge and develop extensions that define the differences in requirements and 
approach for different kinds of projects such as construction, new product 
development, and information systems.”  
 
To mitigate the demonstrated cost and schedule overrun problem, a united global 
project management industry requires an evaluation of the initiated solution and 
an expansion plan to address megaproject management in locations as led by the 
UK. The planned and controlled expansion will be key to reduce the loss factor, 
savings that can be applied to the anticipated infrastructure funding shortfall and 
allow implementation of infrastructure projects to meet the growing needs of 
developed and developing nations.  
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